Abstract-Control-flow integrity (CFI) checks ensure that programs respect their static call-graphs at runtime. A program might violate its call-graph due to malicious attacks such as shellcode injection or return-to-libc style exploits. CFI checking can also be beneficial during testing to discover properties of controlflow, as well as at deployment to detect malicious behavior. We present practical aspects of CFI checking, including advantages and disadvantages of the following: how to represent call-graphs, how to instrument CFI checks, and how to refine CFI checks to properties of control-flow. We discuss two implementations: one instrumenting the source code and the other instrumenting the compiler generated assembly, and we describe their performance. Our paper is meant to be a practical guide to CFI monitoring.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most security attacks on software aim to modify their control-flow maliciously. If the control-flow of a program can be statically determined, then the program's actual controlflow can be monitored at run-time to ensure conformance. This idea is known as control-flow integrity (CFI) [1] , [2] . CFI approaches detect conventional control-flow modifications like the well-known jumping to shellcode [3] and return-tolibc [4] type of attacks, which cause the program's control-flow to violate any possible call-graph of the program. However, carrying out a control-flow attack can be more subtle, such as modifying data values as well; CFI checks can also be used to test for these subtler attacks. Moreover, CFI checks can be used during testing to develop and check properties about the control-flow of a program: e.g., "Do the error handling routines always call the logging function?" From a security standpoint, CFI is a draconian solution, as compared with lower-overhead approaches such as the use of canaries [5] , [6] , [7] , address-space layout randomization [8] , or custom array out-of-bound checks [9] . However, recent work shows these latter approaches to be ineffective at stopping all return-to-libc attacks. In a 2010 paper by Checkoway et al., they demonstrate how to execute return-tolibc attacks that execute arbitrary programs without modifying return addresses [10] . The authors therefore write:
What we show in this paper is that these defenses would not be worthwhile even if implemented in hardware. Resources would instead be better spent deploying a comprehensive solution, such as CFI. While a small number of researchers have explored specific CFI-like approaches [1] , [2] , there has been no discussion of some of the practical trade-offs between design choices of CFI implementations. We discuss design choices regarding the location of CFI checks, at what compiler phase to add the checks, the construction of static call-graphs, and how to check for conformance. Our hope is that this paper provides useful guidance for other CFI implementations for testing and security monitoring.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we overview related work. In Section III, we describe design choices regarding various aspects of CFI, including computing the call-graphs, monitoring the control stack, and developing and testing control-flow properties. In Section IV, we discuss two implementations building on our ideas; one implementation instruments source code, and the other instruments assembly code generated by the compiler. We also provide initial performance benchmarks. Finally, we conclude in Section V, with a brief description of future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A large body of literature exists describing approaches for detecting, preventing, and circumventing attacks to modify the control-flow of C programs. In this section, we briefly review the work most relevant to ours. An extensive recent bibliography for CFI checking can be found in Abadi et al. [1] . We call out specific similarities and differences with prior work in the remainder of the paper.
Oh et al. [2] describe a CFI monitoring approach based on signature-based checks at the beginning of basic machinecode blocks. The motivation for this work is the presence of transient or permanent faults rather than security. Abadi et al. present an approach to CFI, where jumps in the program are instrumented with checks to ensure the targets are valid before jumping [11] , [1] . Their call-graphs are built using static binary analysis, and instrumentation is done by machine-code rewriting, making it language-independent. Our implementations (see Section IV) shows that reasonable efficiency can be achieved with an architecture-independent (but languagedependent) approach performed during compilation. Together, the work of Abadi et al. and our work explore much of the design space for CFI checking.
Petroni and Hicks present an approach for monitoring control-flow attacks to detect Linux kernel rootkits [12] . Their work addresses environments in which some of the assumptions made by Abadi et al. do not hold [11] . The monitoring is external rather than inline: a kernel is periodically validated from a separate monitoring virtual machine.
CFI has been applied to intrusion/anomaly detection by monitoring the call-graph to discover violations of a security policy (e.g., [13] ). These efforts relate to the idea of dynamically learning call-graphs, described in Section III-D.
While we focus on run-time integrity of control, Loscocco et al. address integrity of data with their tool, LKIM [14] . LKIM periodically inspects the memory of its target to monitor whether static data has changed at all and whether dynamic data has changed inappropriately, possibly signaling an attack. LKIM is particularly targeted at inspecting the Linux kernel, but could be applied to other software systems as well.
III. APPROACHES TO CONTROL-FLOW INTEGRITY CHECKING
In this section, we compare and contrast different approaches to CFI checking. We begin by discussing the tradeoffs of different representations of the static call-graph. Next, we address approaches to check the conformance of the control stack to the call-graph, including when and how to make those checks. Finally, we discuss how CFI checking can be used to develop more refined properties about program behavior.
The high-level property that we monitor through CFI checks is that at any point of time during the execution of a program, the program's control stack corresponds to a valid path through its call-graph. Generally, there are two ways in which the conformance check may fail:
• The control stack might contain an unrecognized return address.
• The control stack might contain (at least) two adjacent addresses that correspond to known functions, but there is no known edge between the functions in the call-graph. This case typically indicates a potential "return-to-libc" style attack [4] . The basic CFI algorithm takes a control stack and a callgraph as arguments, and makes sure that the sequence of calls in the control stack corresponds to a valid path in the callgraph, starting from the main function.
With CFI checking, both false positives and false negatives are possible, as we discuss in the following; one important objective for CFI checking is to reduce both of these.
A. Call-graph representations
Here, we discuss three different approaches to constructing call-graphs of C programs suitable for CFI checking. In other work on CFI, the construction and representation of the callgraph is treated mostly as an implementation detail, but its representation can affect the kinds of violations caught as well as affect performance.
As a running example, consider the code snippet and the corresponding three different call-graph representations given in Figure 1 . The program snippet includes four functions that call each other. For convenience, we substitute line numbers in the source code for return addresses. Call-site call-graph
Called-by call-graph Consider the following three approaches to constructing a call-graph: 
}
Consider a CFI check made in function create_msg() against a call-graph in the canonical representation: the check does not know the location in main where the function will return to, but we may wish to ensure that the call will return exactly to the encrypt() statement. A call-site graph provides this level of granularity. Another advantage of a callsite graph over a canonical graph for run-time monitoring is that the former corresponds directly to the return addresses available on the control stack. With the canonical representation, a translation must be made from return addresses to the function names for each monitored call, which incurs some runtime overhead.
The main disadvantage of a call-site graph is that for some programs the call-graphs may be larger, as illustrated in Figure 1 . As compared to the canonical representation, the number of vertices can grow at most linearly, since each function can call a constant number of functions (i.e., each function has a fixed number of call-sites). A call-site call-graph can also have fewer vertices than the canonical form depending on the proportion of terminal functions, i.e., functions that do not contain call-sites themselves. Indeed, in the example above, if the functions create_msg(), encrypt(), and send() contain no calls themselves, the call-site call-graph representation for the code snippet contains no edges at all.
The called-by call-graph representation maintains the advantage of the call-site call-graph insofar as the call-sites conform to the return addresses on the control-stack (obviating the need to translate return addresses to function names at runtime). In contrast with the call-site call-graph, the calledby representation provides a mapping for terminal functions without calls themselves. It does not distinguish callers, however, like the canonical call-graph. Custom checks can be generated statically for each function f, which eliminates the need to dynamically lookup f in the relation. Our fastest implementation uses the called-by call-graph representation. (The work of Abadi et al. primarily considers a call-graph R that is the inverse of our relation R, mapping call-sites to the functions they point to [1] .)
B. Call-graph approximations
Independent of which call-graph representation we choose, we will have to approximate the call-graph for some programs. This may happen if, for example, we are analyzing a program that uses a binary-only library for which we cannot construct the call-graph. A more fundamental reason for approximate call graphs is that, in general, the problem of determining what functions may be called via an indirect call (e.g., via a function pointer in C) is undecidable. Similarly, the use of setjmp/longjmp instructions can also cause call-graph inaccuracies.
For each pair of vertices in the call-graph, there are two possible outcomes of such an approximation:
• Under-approximating the edges may result in rejecting a valid control stack because an edge is missing from the call-graph;
• Over-approximating the edges may result in failing to detect an invalid control stack because there are too many edges in the call-graph. Whether an under-approximation or over-approximation is appropriate depends on the context of CFI checking. An overapproximation may reduce false-positives (i.e., a valid call is erroneously flagged). Unless we are using a gross overapproximation, the probability that an attack falls within the relaxed call-graph is still low.
To improve the results of the indirect pointer analysis, we may use dynamically discovered information, while the program is executing in a trusted (i.e., sand-boxed) environment. This technique may be implemented by generating a modified version of the original program, where each indirect call-site is instrumented to record the address of the function that is being called. The information collected in this way can be used to improve the statically computed call-graph: If the set of edges is known to be an under-approximation, then we may discover additional edges. Conversely, if the set of edges is known to be an over-approximation, then we can discover edges which are known to be valid.
We return to the idea of using dynamically-learned callgraphs in Section III-D when we discuss control-flow properties.
C. Monitoring the control stack
Here we discuss when to perform CFI checks during execution as well as techniques for improving the precision of the checks.
1) When to monitor: We consider three possibilities for when to perform CFI checks: during function prologues, during function epilogues, and elsewhere within a function. (In the work of Abadi et al., monitoring is done at the level of machine-code, providing more options for when to perform checks [1] .) One benefit of prologue checks is that no matter how control-flow arrives at a function, a check is made before executing its body. The disadvantage of prologue-based checks is that attacks that "jump into" the middle of a function are not detected. To illustrate, consider the program in Figure 2 . While f is executing, a buffer overflow is used to overwrite the value of a function pointer to h with an address somewhere in the middle of g. (The +39 offset in line 23 is implementation dependent.) The execution of the program thus progresses as follows: main calls f, where the attack is launched. Once f jumps into the middle of g, a new stack frame is not built for g since the function prologue is skipped. Thus, after g executes its body, it returns directly to main using f's return address. In particular, the printf on line 25 will not be reached, but the one on line 10 (which was not intended) will be executed.
While this program's execution violates its static call-graph, a CFI check that is executed at function prologues will not detect the above attack since the attack causes a jump to the middle of a function. To detect such attacks, the checks should occur in function epilogues.
Two other approaches are possible in addition to-or in lieu of-checks within function prologues and epilogues. First, we may traverse the entire control stack of a program, to check that all return addresses correspond to transitions in the program's call graph. Doing so on every function call is prohibitively expensive, but may nevertheless be useful during testing. However, a full check can be explicitly called at crucial but infrequent points in the control-flow determined by program design or experimentation. (One of our implementations described in Section IV allows for explicit checks.)
Alternatively, the monitor can be a separate program from the one being observed (the monitor must have access to the memory of the observed program in this case, i.e., it must be a privileged process). The advantage of an external monitor is that the observed program has less information about when a check of its control stack against its call-graph occurs. The greatest benefit of external monitoring is that it does not require modification to the target. Less information makes it more difficult for a compromised program's attacker to "cleanup" the control stack in preparation for a conformance check. The drawback of an external process is that the additional complexity of granting access to the observed program's memory may introduce new attack vectors. Furthermore, synchronization must be maintained between monitor and the program to ensure the coherence of the observations. The external monitoring approach has been previously investigated for specialized kernel control-flow integrity monitoring [12] as well as for data-integrity monitoring [14] .
CFI checks can include information about the current state of the program (e.g., the program counter, global variables, etc.) in addition to the return address. With the state, one can check not only that the control-flow conforms to the call-graph, but also that the control stack is valid for the current state. For example, consider the following function:
else h(); } If the control-flow shows f calls g but b == 0, then the control stack is invalid.
Finally, concurrent programs do not present a fundamental difficulty, since each thread has its own control stack. In addition, in one of our implementations, we have explored the use of dedicated threads for CFI checking, improving efficiency on multicore machines (see Section IV-A).
D. From call-graphs to properties
As shown above, control-flow can be data-dependent, so not all paths through the graph correspond to valid execution paths. So far, we have only considered the property of whether a call-stack corresponds to the call-graph, but we can make queries using more sophisticated properties. As a another example of data-dependent control-flow, consider the code fragment in Figure 3 .
A canonical call-graph for this program contains the path e → f → g → h2, which is actually not a valid transition due to the particular data-dependency on this path. (Note that f is called with argument CMD1 on line 18, and hence execution will never reach h2.) Similarly, the path 18 → 14 → 7 in the call-site call-graph is an over-approximation.
A data-flow analysis of the program snippet in Figure 3 might suggest the following property:
"If e calls f and f calls g, then g does not call h2"
We call properties like this trace properties. An execution trace corresponds to a path through the call-graph of a particular program. We would like to specify a set of valid traces, which correspond to descriptions of valid control-stacks. One way to specify such a set is by using a pair (G, S), where G is the program's call-graph, and S is a set of paths through the graph that are invalid. Call-site call-graph 2) if the edge belongs to a path p in S (the set of invalid paths), then check the rest of the control stack to ensure that it does not correspond to p.
Depending on the property, S might be compactly represented as a collection of pairs (f, g), where f and g are vertices in the graph. Such a pair describes all paths in the graph that contain a sub-path from f to g. Thus, (f, g) ∈ S asserts that the function f should never make a call to g, even through a transitive closure of f 's calls. In terms of an implementation, whenever we make a call to g, we should not only check that the last transition corresponds to an edge in G but, also, that f is not present anywhere on the control stack.
The effect of adding (f, g) to S may be stated precisely, using, for instance, a linear-time temporal logic (LTL) formula [15] :
stating, "at all program points, if f is called, then henceforth, no call to g is made". (The formula is interpreted in a model which uses call-sites for states and control-stacks for paths. Function symbols correspond to atomic propositions, such that a proposition f holds of a state s, if s is a call-site that belongs to f .) There are other LTL formulas that correspond to interesting properties of control stacks. For example, the formula:
asserts that the function g may be called only by f , or one of the functions that f called. Using ideas from the model checking literature, more elaborate (and efficient) checks can be implemented using these characterizations [16] .
During program execution, traces can be recorded to build a set of traces. The traces might be seeded with a staticallyapproximated call-graph, or with a null-graph. If the traces are recorded during testing using controlled input, then the set of traces can be used during CFI checks to see if program violates the traces observed during testing. Recorded traces can be more informative than statically-generated call-graphs. Traces correspond to sequences of valid control-stacks, making it possible to check that functions are called with the expected nesting as well as expected order. For example, Feng et al. describe the use of a training phase in their use of CFI for intrusion detection [13] .
IV. IMPLEMENTATIONS
To demonstrate the feasibility and test the performance of our ideas, we have implemented and tested two tools:
1) Source call-graph (CG) checker: Implements CFI checks by instrumenting the source-code of a C program using a canonical call-graph, acting as a front-end to gcc (for creating executables) and ar (for creating libraries). 2) Assembly call-graph (CG) checker: Implements CFI checks by instrumenting the (x86) assembly of a program using a called-by call-graph. After reviewing these implementations below, we present their performance benchmarks.
A. Source CG checker implementation
To implement call-graph conformance checking, we first need to construct a call-graph for the program. This is done in multiple phases: 1) When we compile C source to object code, we analyze the source code to compute an (over-approximated) call graph for each file using an efficient algorithm known to work well for many programs involving function pointers [17] , [18] . The result is a canonical call graph, with function names as the vertices. 2) When we link object files to create an executable, we also "link" the partial call-graphs into a complete callgraph, which we render as a C structure that is compiled and linked with the rest of the program; 3) When we package object files in a library, we also "link" their corresponding call-graphs into a partial call-graph that can be distributed with the library. At run time, we support two modes of execution: manual and automatic. A manual call-graph check may be initiated by the programmer by invoking a function-linked in with the original program-which traverses the current control-stack and checks it against the pre-computed call graph. Programmers may insert calls to this function at critical program points, to ensure that the current function was called in accordance to the overall program call-graph. With just a few carefullyplaced insertions, the overhead of the tool becomes practically negligible.
When used in the automatic mode, the prologue or the epilogue-as specified by the user-of each function is in-strumented with code that will check that there is an edge in the call-graph from the call-site to the current function.
We have also implemented the source CG checker to be selfchecking when used in the automatic mode, by instrumenting its own source-code.
If we are using the canonical call-graph representation, then we need to map return addresses to vertices in the call-graph to perform the check. We do this with a hash-table which maps return addresses to the corresponding nodes in the canonical call-graph. This hash-table is computed using the binary file descriptor (BFD) library, 1 , which searches through the debugging information associated with the program. Once we have found the nodes for a function and its caller, we check that there is a corresponding edge in the call graph. For simplicity, our implementation constructs the hash-table at run-time. This has a significant overhead, which shows in the performance results reported in Section IV-C. A more practical solution should construct the hash-table mapping return addresses to nodes in the graph statically, before executing the program.
One significant advantage of this particular approach is that it is platform-independent, at least as far as gcc itself is. (Our implementation can be thought of as a front-end to gcc.) Furthermore, it easily integrates with build systems, requiring only a few small changes to typical Makefile based code bases.
The drawback to our implementation is that some compiler optimizations may invalidate the computed call-graph. For example, consider a situation where a function f may call a function g, and g may call h:
• If the compiler inlines the definition of g at the call-site in f, then we need to add an additional edge from f to h because now f may call h directly,
• If the compiler decides to use a tail-call for the call from g to h, then we need to add an edge from f to h, and remove the edge from g to h because h will reuse g's stack frame.
Therefore, these optimizations need to be turned off for correct construction of the call-graph when using our source CG implementation. Ideally, the call-graph construction would use gcc itself, using the plugin library [19] . By default, our call-graph checking implementations, the source CG checker and the assembly CG checker that we shall describe below, check only that the most recent function call conforms to a transition in the call-graph. An alternative is to check the entire control-stack on each function call. Unsurprisingly, checking the entire control-stack generally incurs too much performance overhead. However, on multicore systems, performance of full call-graph checking can be 1 http://sourceware.org/binutils/docs/bfd/index.html improved using parallel threads to perform the CFI checks on cores unused by the instrumented program. The idea can of course be generalized to multiple checking threads as well. A new CFI check occurs when the previous check has finished. The implementation introduces some degree of randomness for CFI checks, since when the next check is scheduled depends on the scheduling of the threads.
B. Assembly CG checker implementation
Our second implementation, the assembly CG checker, computes a called-by call graph by analyzing the assembly code generated by the compiler.
We use the called-by call-graph relation to generate a custom validation function for each function in the program. (We have not implemented analysis for indirect function calls in the assembly CG checker. Currently, the only way to avoid false positives is by dynamically improving the call-graph as described in Section III-A.) These functions are generated just before we link the executable, at which point all the call sites in the program are known.
Sample code that we generate when compiling the bzip2 compression program [20] is given in Figure 4 . Variables with CS in the name are labels for the different call-sites in the program, while the variable ret is the address of the caller of the function. Analyzing the assembly (instead of the source) has the following benefits:
1) The assembly CG checker is fully compatible with compiler optimizations because the analysis is done post-optimizations, 2) The tool is not restricted to programs written in C, and 3) Call-sites are directly referenced in the call-graph by adding labels to the assembly code.
The main disadvantage of this implementation is that, while it is not language-specific, it is platform-specific as it directly works on compiler generated assembly programs.
C. Performance benchmarks
We performed benchmark performance tests using bzip2, a commonly-used compression program, 3 an open-source AES implementation, 4 and a small program representing an upperbound on the performance penalty incurred (by repeatedly making 10 billion function calls), the results of which are captured in Figure 5 . The experiments were performed on a 3GHz Intel Pentium machine, running Xen/Linux compiled with gcc. We report the performance overhead as a multiplier of the execution times of the uninstrumented programs. The column "-O2" denotes whether the particular configuration is optimized-a configuration is either optimized with the -O2 flag or it is unoptimized. (Recall that optimizations may interfere with the Source CG checker but not the assembly checker.)
For bzip2, the source code is about 6.2k LOCs. There are 201 functions (including libc functions). The benchmarks are generated by compressing a 100MB text file. (In this case, we did not have to turn off optimizations since they did not affect the validity of the call-graph.)
In our benchmarks using AES, we execute Rijndael MonteCarlo tests at the key lengths 128, 192, and 256 (the tests are included with the distribution) 10 times each. The program itself is approximately 700 lines (not including white space), containing 63 functions, including libc calls. In the case of AES, the source CG checker tool has particularly high overhead when compared to the uninstrumented program since in that configuration, the program is unoptimized.
The final test executes a small program in which two functions iteratively call each other 10 billion times. Because the program does negligible computation (decrementing an integer i and checking whether i < 0) other than function calls, the program represents an upper-bound on the overhead of the implementations. The actual overhead of a typical program is typically far lower.
The assembly CG checker's overhead is quite low-2% in the case of bzip2 and AES. (Remember though that indirect function calls are ignored the implementation of the assembly CG checker.)
V. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND FUTURE

WORK
We have described practical approaches and two implementations for control-flow integrity monitoring. Our approach allows us to detect a different class of malicious control-flow modifications than previous work, and may be combined with existing techniques to increase the confidence that a program is executing as intended. More generally, our work provides an efficient framework upon which to build more fine-grained run-time monitors.
• As alluded to in our discussion, our implementations do much of the work that a compiler already does, including aspects of parsing, linking, and determining return addresses at runtime. An "industrial-strength" implementation of a call-graph checking tool should be integrated into gcc, and facilities have recently been developed for doing so [19] . As stand-alone tools, their ease of use ranged from changing a couple of lines in a Makefile to substantive rewriting.
• We implemented the compile-time aspects of our implementations in the functional language Haskell [21] . Modern high-level languages, like Haskell, are wellsuited to language analysis tasks and make prototyping new tools easy. We particularly relied on Haskell libraries, such as Language-C, which provides C parsing and C code generation.
5
• Although BFD (described in Section IV-A) works well, its performance overhead is too high to use in production systems. Although it is natural for a programmer to think in terms of canonical call-graphs, that representation is too expensive for CFI, unless it can be done statically.
There are a number of directions for future work. Developing a property specification language for monitoring controlflow properties along the lines we described in Section III-D would be a useful addition. Moreover, we have described various trade-offs throughout this paper, but we have not investigated all of them. Another direction would be applying these approaches to programs written in other languages or to specific domains, e.g., embedded systems code. 
